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As we think about what kind of security architecture the United States would like to see take root 
in the Persian Gulf, and the role that the United States may end up playing in that architecture, 
we have to start from two fundamental questions:  
• What do we — the United States — want such a regional security architecture to 
achieve? 
• What is the political basis for cooperation among the governments comprising the 
architecture? 
Defining "Architecture" 
Before addressing any of those questions, I should say a word about what I mean by 
"architecture." It is not an ideal term, but alternatives like "structure" or "framework" seem to me 
to be worse. We need to be careful about prejudging the institutional form of the region's post-
Saddam security arrangements and therefore to avoid using language that automatically implies 
a rigid set of formal organizations and rules. I intend "architecture" to refer generically to a 
collection of arrangements — formal, informal or both — that operate coherently with each other 
to achieve our security objectives. Perhaps the analogy is with landscape architecture — an 
intentionally shaped environment, not a fixed building. In other words, the pre-war Gulf security 
architecture could be said to have comprised the Gulf Cooperation Council, U.S. bilateral 
agreements with and presence in the GCC states, the U.S.-U.K.-enforced no-fly and no-
reinforcement zones in Iraq, UN sanctions against Iraq, bilateral relations between various Gulf 
states and Iran, and so on. 
Objectives: What do we want to achieve? 
Historically, we have thought about Gulf security predominantly in terms of threats to the region, 
whether we were talking about the USSR, Nasser's Egypt, Iran, or Iraq. Despite 9/11, we still 
have to consider such conventional threats. The people of the world still depend on Gulf oil and 
gas supplies for their well being and development. 9/11 did not change that. 
 
What 9/11 did do was to highlight that in addition to the threats to the Gulf, there are also threats 
emanating from the Gulf. Terrorism is the most obvious of these, but also proliferation, especially 
with increasing ranges of delivery systems.  
 
One would assume we would want security architectures that could cope with all of these 
challenges — conventional military threats, proliferation, and terrorism. And if the fight against 
terrorism ultimately depends on democratic political development in the Middle East, as President 
Bush contends, then we should seek security architectures or arrangements that foster that 
development, or at least do not hinder it. 
 
This is directly relevant to the question of what kind of U.S. military presence is desirable. It is 
important to remember that President Bush did not endorse the view that freedom will be brought 
to the Arabs at the point of American bayonets. On the contrary, he said, "The democratic 
progress we've seen in the Middle East was not imposed from abroad, and neither will the greater 
progress we hope to see. Freedom, by definition, must be chosen, and defended by those who 
choose it." 
 
So if the U.S. armed forces are not the instrument of choice for carrying out the reshaping of the 
domestic political order in the countries of the Middle East, then we have to ask whether the 
presence of military forces advances or retards the reform process. I believe it tends to retard it, 
for the following four reasons, all of which are borne out by recent experience: 
1. Having U.S. combat forces in a country magnifies the United States' already considerable 
interest in the host country's "stability" — stability in the sense of maintaining public order 
and keeping the current regime in power. Domestic political turmoil places access to 
facilities at risk. Public disorder and extremist dissent can raise issues of force protection. 
Similarly, U.S. officials are constrained from frank exchanges with the host government 
on issues like human rights and political reform because of the priority they place on 
preserving the good relations that allow access. 
2. In the eyes of the host country — both rulers and ruled — the presence of American 
forces often constitutes an implied endorsement of the ruling regime and an implied 
commitment to guarantee its survival not only against external threats but against 
domestic ones as well. They often assume the existence of a tacit quid pro quo: we give 
them bases, they think, and they give us protection. A regime that might otherwise be 
inclined to introduce reforms in response to domestic social and political pressures can 
be encouraged to "hang tough" if it believes the Americans are committed to rescue it in 
extremis. 
3. As reflected in a number of Osama bin Ladin's pronouncements, as well as in the 1992 
"Memorandum of Advice" to King Fahd from a group of conservative Saudi clerics, the 
presence of U.S. forces in a country can delegitimize its government by calling into 
question the regime's ability to provide for the common defense. How U.S. military 
presence affects the popular legitimacy of the government will be a growing issue in Iraq 
as well — constantly calibrating the needs of security against those of legitimacy will be a 
crucial task for the Administration for as long as U.S. forces remain in Iraq. 
4. The U.S. military presence itself becomes the hot button issue of national political debate 
— particularly if such questions as host nation support costs or concessional status of 
forces terms become issues of public debate. This is not unique to the Gulf — witness 
the political hay that Okinawan politicians have been able to make from the criminal 
conduct of U.S. military personnel on the island. The heat generated over these issues 
drives out discussion and addressal of the more fundamental issues facing the polity. 
Before 9/11 and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States essentially sought a Gulf security 
architecture that guaranteed regional stability for the purpose of securing the flow of energy 
supplies to world markets at reasonable prices. While we did not guarantee the political tenure of 
the regional regimes, and even criticized their more egregious violations of international human 
rights standards, we would have been more than satisfied by any arrangement that kept the 
Iranians out, the Iraqis down, and the Americans in, to paraphrase Lord Ismay's famous comment 
about NATO in the 1950s. In the new Persian Gulf, it is hard to imagine that Washington will 
believe that is enough. 
Political Basis for Cooperation 
The lack of an enduring political basis for cooperation has been the Achilles heel of previous 
efforts to construct a formal regional security structure in the Gulf. Experience suggests that the 
countries of the region perceive the areas in which their interests conflict with one another as 
outweighing those in which they coincide. In Europe after World War II, the downside of 
cooperation among historic competitors was offset by the dire threat presented by the Soviet 
presence to the East. In the Gulf, however, even the imminent threat posed by Iraq immediately 
after the invasion of Kuwait could not fully overcome the rivalries and mistrust among members of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council or the reservations that many of them had regarding cooperation 
with outside forces.  
 
Internecine competition, rivalry, and mistrust among the GCC states have not been the only 
political obstacles to intraregional cooperation. The states of the region also have sharply 
different threat perceptions. Over the past ten years, Kuwait was naturally most immediately 
concerned about the threat from Iraq; several hundred miles down the Gulf, the UAE saw little 
threat from Baghdad but was deeply concerned about its offshore territorial dispute with Iran. 
None of the other GCC members, with the possible exception of Oman, have shared Saudi 
Arabia's concerns about Yemen; none except Kuwait have shared Riyadh's visceral antipathy 
toward Jordan. Qatar and Oman have each entered into informal, low-level interaction with Israel, 
something that remains anathema elsewhere in the region. 
 
In the present environment, the Gulf states are even less likely than in the past to share one 
another's policy agendas or threat perceptions, particularly if we add post-Saddam Iraq or a 
sporadically evolving Iran to the regional mix. At some point, Iraq will once again be a major 
player in the region. Ultimately oil money will begin to flow; ultimately U.S. and international 
constraints on Iraqi capabilities will be lifted. Even assuming our efforts to instill democratic rule in 
Iraq are successful, the GCC states will still find themselves with militarily superior and politically 
alien force to their north; will they perceive this renascent Iraq as a friend or as a potential foe? 
Even apart from likely divergences on the ever-crucial issue of oil production policy, what 
common ground will militarily weak Sunni-dominated conservative monarchies find with a 
relatively strong Shia-dominated, multi-ethnic democratic republic? 
 
The problem of finding common political ground is only magnified if we consider the United States 
as part of the regional security equation. True, the U.S. and each of the Gulf states have common 
enemies in terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
countries like Iran presents a challenge to their interests as well as to ours. But it is certainly not 
clear that they and we will have common approaches in how to deal with these problems. It has 
never been out of the question that the Saudis, for example, will respond to Iranian acquisition of 
WMD by seeking countervailing capabilities of their own — they did so in the case of missiles 
nearly two decades ago — or that the smaller Gulf states will find appeasement of Iran less costly 
than cooperation with the United States. As to terrorism, if the United States' prescription is a 
democratic revolution throughout the region, it is quite possible that current rulers such as Sultan 
Qaboos of Oman and the al-Nuhayyans of the UAE will find our proposed cure worse than the 
disease.  
Conclusion 
Where does this bleak assessment lead us?  
 
I do not think it leads to the conclusion that the Gulf region does not need or can never have a 
functional security architecture. Every region has at least a de facto security architecture, whether 
it is an unstable balance of power, single state hegemony, formally structured collective security, 
or something in between. The United States continues to have a vital interest in the stability of the 
Gulf region, provided that we understand "stability" as being capable of a dynamic interpretation 
and not just a static one. The external threats to the Gulf as well as the threats to the rest of the 
world emanating from within the Gulf can still jeopardize the lives of American citizens, disrupt 
energy markets, and more broadly generate tension and conflict throughout the Middle East. 
 
However, it does suggest several points that should be kept in mind in crafting such an 
architecture: 
1. Regional states will be very leery of binding formal agreements that lock them into 
relationships in which there is no underlying trust. Institutional structures will have to grow 
out of habits of cooperation, not the other way around. 
2. Given the absence of universally shared interests, objectives, or threats, these habits of 
cooperation must develop in the context of less-than-universal relationships. The 
implication is that we should be looking at a multitude of overlapping vehicles for 
cooperation, formal and informal, in which regional states learn to work together on more 
narrowly focused functional concerns.  
3. The United States needs to think very carefully about what kind of role it can best play in 
promoting the evolution of such an architecture, both diplomatically and militarily. Habits 
of cooperation developed under U.S. tutelage and pressure are not habits of cooperation. 
A major purpose of any undertaking in this area should be to encourage the states of the 
region to take more responsibility for their own security futures. This does not mean 
disengagement, but it may mean exerting a lighter diplomatic touch. 
4. I have already discussed the down-side of U.S. military presence. That does not mean 
U.S. military presence should go to zero, but we need to look long and hard at how big a 
presence, how visible, where, and with what kind of forces. Clearly we need to maintain 
the capability to respond to major conventional and WMD threats to our interests and, 
perhaps more importantly, to be able to strike quickly and decisively against terrorist 
threats that states in or near the Gulf region are unable to deal with. But it is also clear 
that in the post-Saddam environment much of this can be done without a highly visible 
force footprint. 
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